Law, learning and representation  by Ashley, Kevin D. & Rissland, Edwina L.
Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 17–58
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint
Law, learning and representation
Kevin D. Ashley a,∗, Edwina L. Rissland b
a Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
b Department of Computer Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
Received 7 September 2001
Abstract
In machine learning terms, reasoning in legal cases can be compared to a lazy learning approach
in which courts defer deciding how to generalize beyond the prior cases until the facts of a new case
are observed. The HYPO family of systems implements a “lazy” approach since they defer making
arguments how to decide a problem until the programs have positioned a new problem with respect
to similar past cases. In a kind of “reflective adjustment”, they fit the new problem into a patchwork
of past case decisions, comparing cases in order to reason about the legal significance of the relevant
similarities and differences. Empirical evidence from diverse experiments shows that for purposes of
teaching legal argumentation and performing legal information retrieval, HYPO-style systems’ lazy
learning approach and implementation of aspects of reflective adjustment can be very effective.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Law as a learning system
As everyone knows, a large part of what we call law is comprised of rules and cases.
Law, especially in Common Law countries such as the United States and the United
Kingdom, is based on a combination of statutes, constitutions, and cases; in Civil Law
countries, such as France, it is based more directly on rules and codes. However, it is
universal that legal rules play a large part of any legal system. The legal rules come
from a variety of sources: legislatures may fashion them in statutes, agencies may adopt
them as regulations, courts may promulgate them as rules for deciding current cases
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and summarizing the meaning of past cases, and practitioners use them to distill past
experience.
Legal rules are dynamic; they change in response to social and political influences. As
society develops economically, technologically and culturally, new disputes arise. Lower
courts decide the new cases in light of existing legal rules with results that may not square
with changing political, social and cultural realities. Legislatures, agencies or higher courts
may respond by changing the legal rules or applying them differently, conforming the
results of new cases to the new realities.
Two ways in which one can change the effect of a rule are by (1) changing the rule
itself, for instance, by adding conjuncts to pre-conditions or listing exceptions to the rule,
or (2) changing the meaning of the rule’s constituent concepts. We will refer to the first
type of change as change in the rule’s structure and the second type as a change in the
meaning of its terms. Where legal rules define legal concepts—the rule’s prerequisites give
sufficient conditions for inclusion in the concept class given by the conclusion—both types
of change are, at their heart, conceptual change. Change in legal concepts is essential to
the dynamism of law.
Legal concepts are what philosophers call “open textured” [28]: they cannot be defined
by necessary and sufficient conditions which are universally valid over their domain of
application. Rather, at least according to Hart’s theory, legal concepts have a “core of
settled meaning” in which there is little debate over interpretation and a “penumbra” in
which interpretation is debatable. Legal rules derive their dynamic nature in part through
the dynamic, open-textured nature of the terms used in the rules. As new situations arise,
interpretation of the meaning of these terms changes as well. So not only can rules change
when new prerequisites, exceptions, or conclusions arise, but also when new interpretations
of terms used in the rule are made as cases are decided and rules are applied.
In this sense, reasoning in legal cases can be compared with a learning system. The
rules and their constituent terms change in light of the experience of deciding new
cases. Legislatures, agencies and courts, however, differ dramatically in how they change
legal rules. Legislatures and agencies tend to effect structural changes of rules. Courts
promulgate rules and definitions, too, and thus they also perform structural changes, but
in addition, a court may change the meaning of a rule’s constituent terms as it applies the
rule in deciding a new problem. Since only courts apply rules in deciding specific fact
situations, only a court can change the meanings of a rule’s constituent terms as well as a
rule’s structure as it applies the rule.1
If courts and legislatures can simply adjust legal rules in light of the acceptability of
their applications, one might argue that nothing can be learned in such a process. That
is, if “the law” does not exist independently of the formulations of legislatures and the
pronouncements of judges, it might be argued that they create rather than discover the law.
Presumably, this would be different from a machine learning program that may discover a
new law of physics from instances of its application but does not create one.
1 In describing the relationship of courts and legal rules, this paper focuses on American practice. The practice
in other legal jurisdictions may differ.
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While this argument raises a philosophical issue of considerable depth, it does not
give sufficient weight to the complex constraints on courts, and even on legislatures,
in formulating and adjusting legal rules. Lawmakers must accommodate developing
ethical norms, economic and political principles, social policies, public expectations, past
commitments and decisions, language-related conventions, and technological advances.
Jurisprudential scholars like Levi, Dworkin, Sunstein, and Brewer, describe processes of
discovering legal rules, subjecting them to rigorous scrutiny in light of these complex
criteria, and evaluating the tradeoffs rules effect. In this sense, formulating legal rules is
a process of discovering what will work in accommodating these criteria, not creating
arbitrary norms out of whole cloth with no consequences. In any event, whether one
believes “the law” is a learning system or not, there are interesting relations between legal
reasoning and learning. As discussed below, what courts and legislatures do at various
points in the process has many affinities with what is done when attempting to learn rules
from examples.
2. Eager vs. lazy learning in law
In structurally changing legal rules in advance, legislatures and agencies engage in
something like “eager” learning. In eager learning, one “generalizes beyond the training
data before observing the new query” [emphasis added] [38, p. 244]. When a legislature
or agency formulates a rule, it does so before observing the new disputes to which the rule
will be applied.
An eager learning process may be incremental. A legislature may explicitly revise
a statutory rule based on its observations of problematic decisions of specific cases by
courts. In so doing, the legislature may induce new concepts and put them into effect by
formulating new rules, by modifying existing rules structurally, adding conjuncts or listing
exceptions, or by specifying how the rule is to be applied in the future. Even in such
an incremental process, however, the revisions occur before the new instances have been
observed to which the revised rule will be applied. Note that this form of eager learning
does not necessarily mean greedy learning; a greedy algorithm formulates a sequence of
rules without backtracking and is thus not guaranteed to find the smallest or best set of
rules that covers the training examples [38, p. 276].
As they decide cases, courts, even high courts, change legal rules, but they do so under
constraints that do not apply to legislatures and agencies. In the first place, courts almost
never get a chance to change legal rules except in the context of deciding a particular
case. A court may be mindful of the effect of its decision on future cases, but its job is
to decide the case before it. Secondly, courts in Common Law countries, decide cases in
light of precedents. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts are supposed to assign the
same outcome to a case as the outcomes of similar cases decided previously in the same
jurisdiction. Even the United States Supreme Court will attempt to reconcile the decision of
a current case with its previous decisions, or, at least it takes pains to distinguish the current
case from the precedent cases, explaining how the relevant differences justify different
outcomes.
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Lower courts are even more tightly constrained to decide cases according to the rules
and precedents set out by their supervisory courts; they must be consistent with those
courts’ previous decisions. In the federal court system, the United States District Court of
a particular state or district occupies the lowest rung; these are the trial courts in which
disputes are heard initially. For instance, the Justice Department’s antitrust action against
Microsoft Corp. in connection with the Windows operating system was tried in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. After trial Microsoft attempted to appeal
directly to the United States Supreme Court for review, but that Court denied the direct
appeal and remanded the case to the second rung of the ladder, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, which affirmed the decision in part and reversed it in
part. Again attempting to climb to the top rung, Microsoft appealed the adverse portion of
the Court of Appeals decision to the Supreme Court, which declined to review it.
The eager learning-like behavior of legislatures and agencies contrasts with that of
courts when they decide specific cases, engaging in something like lazy learning. Lazy-
learning “defer[s] the decision of how to generalize beyond the training data until a new
query instance is observed” [38, p. 240].
The notion of Lazy Learning subsumes a family of algorithms, that store the complete
set of given (classified) examples of an underlying example language and delay all
further calculations, until requests for classifying yet unseen instances are received.
Of course, the time required for classifying an unseen instance will be higher, if all
calculations have to be done when (and each time) a request occurs. The advantage
of such algorithms is, that they do not have to output a single hypothesis, assigning
a fixed class to each instance of the example language, but they can use different
approximations for the target concept/function, which are constructed to be locally
good. That way examples similar to a requested instance receive higher attention during
the classification process. [39]
In attempting to decide a current case consistently with past case decisions, courts may
modify legal rules by structurally changing them or by changing the meaning of their terms.
In either event, however, the court changes the rules only in the context of deciding the
observed new instance (i.e., the current fact situation to be decided) and, in this sense, the
court engages in something like lazy learning. Once a court observes a new fact situation, it
may reinterpret even a rule that the legislature devised specifically to deal with such cases;
the court’s generalizing is not completed until it observes and decides the new instance.
Given the constraints of deciding only current cases and stare decisis, it may be
surprising that courts manage to change legal rules over time as much as they do. In fact,
courts exercise tremendous power over the content of legal rules, even those adopted by
legislatures or enshrined in Constitutions. It is not uncommon in law for “the exceptions
to swallow the rule”. For instance, in a series of cases the once-strong protection under
the 4th Amendment of the US Constitution against unreasonable searches has been almost
completely eroded with respect to police searches of automobiles [45]. Presumably, each
individual decision respected earlier precedents, but the resulting rule is nearly the opposite
of where it started.
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Often one observes courts and legislatures engaged in a kind of dialectical point-
counterpoint as they alternatively apply eager and lazy learning approaches to address
a perceived social need. For instance, developments in the law of personal bankruptcy
illustrate this. In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979, Congress attempted to address the
needs of consumer debtors by enabling a debtor to propose a three to five year plan in which
he will dedicate a portion of his disposable income—that is, the surplus remaining after
expenses, such as living expenses, are paid—to resolve his debts; successful completion of
the plan discharges the entire debt regardless of the portion that is actually paid. In order
to minimize abuse, Congress drafted the statute to require that “the plan has been proposed
in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law” [Sec 1325(a)(3)].
Congress, however, provided no explicit definition of what constitutes “good faith”. In
order to apply this rule, courts looked for various indicia of good faith in the debtor’s plan,
such as the percentage of repayment to unsecured creditors. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1982 in the case In re Estus approached the good faith issue by announcing
eleven factors in its opinion:
“We make no attempt to enumerate all relevant considerations since the factors and
the weight they are to be given will vary with the facts and circumstances of the case.
However, in addition to the percentage of repayment to unsecured creditors, some of the
factors that a court may find meaningful in making its determination of good faith are:
(1) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debtor’s surplus;
(2) the debtor’s employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of future increases
in income; and
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan”
. . .
[In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982) at 317]
For instance, higher percentages of disposable income dedicated to the proposed plan
were used as an indication that the debtor was acting in good faith presumably because this
indicated that the debtor was doing all he could.
In subsequent cases, many courts used the Estus factors in determining whether the
debtor met the good faith requirement. In so doing, however, those courts were not applying
some rule set out by the Court in Estus to define good faith.
Instead, the Estus Court initiated something like lazy learning; the Court “defer[s]
the decision of how to generalize beyond the training data until a new query instance
is observed” [38, p. 240]. The Estus Court anticipated this kind of behavior in its
introductory disclaimers. The Court provided a useful, but not exhaustive, list of the
relevant considerations. Other factors may still be relevant. In addition, the relative
significance or weight of even the listed factors will depend on the particular facts and
circumstances of the current case. The Court specifically eschewed offering a “bright line
rule” in favor of a guided, but fundamentally case-by-case analysis.
The Court’s presentation of factors as guides to decision-making is an intermediate
step between a completely lazy learning approach and an eager fashioning of a rule-like
definition. Determination of all of the factors that may be relevant and of the relative
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significance of these factors is deferred until the new case is observed. Below, we will
see other examples of courts engaged in much less guided lazy learning.
Apparently, Congress was not entirely satisfied with the trend in court decisions
approving debtors’ plans at the expense of creditors, so it engaged in an eager-learning-
like response by making structural changes to the bankruptcy rule. In 1984, the law
was amended explicitly to require, under certain circumstances, dedication of 100% of
disposable income to the proposed plan [Sec 1325(b)(1)]:
“. . . the court may not approve the plan unless. . . (B) the plan provides that all of the
debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the three-year period beginning
on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments
under the plan”.
Of course, Congress’s eager-learning-like change shifted the onus of determining good
faith to the determination of disposable income. Subsequently, courts engaged in a period
of lazy learning, this time focusing on the concept of disposable income.
3. A version space model of a legal learning system
Legal philosophers have developed various models of how courts change legal rules
as they decide cases under constraints. Sometimes the models come tantalizingly close to
invoking what AI practitioners would recognize as a machine learning approach.
In 1933, the legal philosopher Max Radin characterized the development of the modern
legal concept of product liability from a line of court decisions in a way that reminds one
of a search through a version space of legal concepts in the manner of Mitchell’s Candidate
Elimination Algorithm (CEA) [37]. In a version space model, concept learning is a search
through a large space of hypotheses implicitly defined by the representation of hypotheses
in a general-to-specific partial ordering (see, e.g., [38, p. 24]). Radin wrote:
“The single instance is capable of generalization, and the generalization will not stop at
any particular place, unless by negative decision, by a statement that a given situation
is outside the genus, a subsequent court has deliberately attempted to stop it. Then
the process begins all over again, because the excluded situation is itself capable of
successive generalizations and we must know whether a large or small genus is to be
excluded from (A). A Buick car is not in (A). Is an automobile truck? An electric
machine? A hypothetical new type of car driven by more explosive mixtures than
gasoline, and so on?” [41, p. 209]
Radin, and later Edward Levi [34], describe the history of case decision-making—that
is, lazy learning—that led courts to change the legal rules of product liability, whether
a manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by its product to a purchaser with whom the
manufacturer has never dealt. For instance, if you buy defective automobile tires and they
fall apart and cause you to be injured, the manufacturer of the tires must compensate you for
your injuries even though you bought the tires from an intermediate vendor like a service
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station (hence, you are called a “third party” or a “remote purchaser”), and not directly
from the tire manufacturer.
Through a series of cases spanning the period from 1852 to 1916, the New York courts
completely turned the rule around. At the start of this history, the law required “privity”
of contract, that is, an immediate seller-purchaser relationship between manufacturer and
injured. The legal “privity rule” was:
“A manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote purchaser.” [34,
p. 25]
That is, “no privity, no liability”.
Over the course of this episode of legal history, the courts, in effect, dispensed with
the conceptual requirement of privity. In its place, they created the concept of inherently
dangerous, fleshed out its meaning, and used it to define a rule (actually an exception to the
privity rule) for product liability. By the episode’s end, the rule governing product liability
had been transformed to:
“If an article is inherently dangerous, a manufacturer becomes liable for negligent
construction which, when added to its inherent characteristics, makes it imminently
dangerous.” [34, p. 18]
The transformation began with the 1852 case of Thomas and Wife v. Winchester, decided
in the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court. At the local druggist, Mr.
Thomas filled a prescription for dandelion extract for his ailing wife. The druggist filled the
prescription from a jar bought from another druggist, who had bought it from Winchester,
the manufacturer and packager. Unfortunately the jar contained belladonna, a substance
that looks similar to dandelion extract but acts quite differently. Mrs. Thomas became very
sick with “derangements of the mind”. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas sued Winchester and won.
The court justified its departure from the privity rule by saying that misbranded poisons,
such as belladonna, were so “imminently dangerous”—like a loaded gun in the hands of a
child—that they were sure to cause injury to remote purchasers.
“The defendant’s negligence put human life in imminent danger. . . . The defendant’s
duty arose out of the nature of his business and the danger to others incident to
its mismanagement. Nothing but mischief like that which actually happened could
have been expected from sending the poison falsely labeled into the market; and the
defendant is justly responsible for the probable consequences of the act. The duty of
exercising caution in this respect did not arise out of the defendant’s contract of sale to
[the druggist]. The wrong done by the defendant was in putting the poison, mislabeled,
into the hands of [the druggist] as an article of merchandise to be sold and afterwards
used as the extract of dandelion, by some person then unknown.”
[Thomas and Wife v. Winchester 6 N.Y. 397 at p. 405]
The Thomas case created an exception to the privity rule: If an item were imminently
dangerous, then there could be liability without privity of contract. The question now was,
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how far would this exception grow beyond the instance of belladonna, the most particular
and narrow interpretation. How much more general a rule would it become in the version
space hierarchy? Clearly the rule should not cover every manufactured item, the most
sweeping and general interpretation. But could it become general enough to swallow up
the old privity rule itself, that is, allow recovery in cases where it was once said there could
be no recovery? In the visual metaphor of version spaces, at which level should the rule
reside?
In the next sixty or so years, the New York Court of Appeals decided a variety of cases
involving liability without privity of contract. These cases brought pressure to enlarge the
class of objects for which there could be recovery in two ways: (1) by classifying more
items as imminently dangerous or inherently dangerous as the concept had come to be
named and thus falling under the rule of the Thomas case, or (2) by restricting (or finding
exceptions to) a more general class of items dangerous only if defective, which the court
was also reasoning about during this period, and for which the courts generally denied
liability.
The classification process was neither neat nor consistent. While courts found
manufacturers liable for injuries caused by a defective painter’s scaffold, aerated-water
bottle, and coffee urn, they found no liability in connection with a defective balance
wheel, and steam boiler. Nor were the decisions very coherent. At the same time it was
enlarging the class of inherently dangerous items by allowing more items to be covered by
the Thomas rule, the court was steadfastly refusing to expand the exception to the more
general class of dangerous only if defective objects for which recovery continued to be
denied:
“One who manufactures articles inherently dangerous, e.g., poisons, dynamite, gunpow-
der, torpedoes, bottles of aerated water under pressure, is liable in tort to third parties. . .
On the other hand, one who manufactures articles dangerous only if defectively made,
or installed, e.g., tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors hung on the walls, carriages, auto-
mobiles, and so on is not liable to third parties for injuries caused by them, except in
case of willful injury or fraud.”
[Cadillac v. Johnson at p. 803]
The transformation of the privity rule was completed in 1916 when the New York Court
of Appeals decided the case of MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382. It allowed MacPherson,
a third party, to recover for injuries caused by a Buick, an item it had just the year before
classified as dangerous only if defective and for which it would not allow liability in the
Cadillac case! So either cars were misclassified—they should have been in the narrower
inherently dangerous class—or equivalently that class should be larger and include cars, or
the exception was too narrowly construed—it should cover more of the broader dangerous
only if defective class. In Cardozo’s landmark opinion, the court said:
“We hold then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons,
explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation are
implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. . . . If to
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the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacture of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. . .where danger
is to be foreseen, a liability will follow. . . . We have put aside the notion that the duty to
safeguard life and limb, when consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out
of contract and nothing else.”
[MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, at p. 389f]
In this passage, Cardozo sounded the death knell for the “no privity, no liability” rule
and enlarged the exception beyond the class of inherently dangerous items. In fact, Cardozo
seems to enlarge the class for which recovery is to be allowed to the broader class of items
dangerous only if defective. In other words, he pushes the rule up the concept hierarchy in
a very version-space-like manner. By 1964, an authoritative restatement of the rule stated,
“One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer. . ., although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.” [Restatement, Second, Torts
§402A. Special Liability of Seller of Products for Physical Harm to User or Consumer]
4. Beyond mechanical jurisprudence
In the domains to which version space approaches have been applied (e.g., integral
calculus) it is reasonable to make an assumption about the induced classification rules: that
the rules will be applied to new cases in a process of logical inference.
The assumption that legal rules are always applied deductively is akin to a view of law
called formalism or mechanical jurisprudence. According to mechanical jurisprudence, the
legal system can be “reduced to a very small number of general principles . . . composed
of rigidly defined concepts to generate specific legal conclusions by a logical, objective,
and scientific process of deduction” [58, pp. 496–497]. Roscoe Pound, a member of the
legal realist movement, criticized formalism as “‘mechanical jurisprudence’ because the
classical lawyers had a tendency to apply their general principles relentlessly—regardless
of the underlying policies or the consequences of these policies in specific cases” [58,
p. 499].
The assumption that “the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge” has
long been discredited as an oversimplification, by legal realists (including Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Jerome Frank) and more recently by another jurisprudential
scholar, Edward Levi, who refers to this assumption as the “pretense of legal reasoning”
[34, pp. 1, 18]. According to this pretense, “given a new set of facts, such as a defective
coffee urn or boiler which blew up and killed a man” [34, p. 18], one proceeds simply by
asking such questions as (depending on which version of the rule obtains):
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Is the man a “remote purchaser”?
Is the article “inherently dangerous”?
Does the defect make it “imminently dangerous”?
In order to answer these questions, one also needs rules defining the legal predicates such
as “remote purchaser”, “inherently dangerous” and “imminently dangerous”. Such rules
may have been induced from past cases in a version space-type process, too, but then, it is
assumed, they are applied deductively. At some point, however, deduction fails; the rules
run out before all of these predicates have been defined adequately [29].
4.1. Legal reasoning by examples
In contrast to the pretense of deductively applying legal rules, Levi presented his own
account of legal reasoning as a 3-step process of reasoning by example, in which a court:
(1) Sees relevant similarities between a current target case and a past source case.
(2) Announces a rule of law inherent in the source case.
(3) Makes the rule of law apply to the target case
[34, p. 2] [emphasis added].
The finding of relevant similarities (and differences) is the key step in Levi’s version of the
legal process [34, p. 2], distinguishing it from mechanical jurisprudence.
“The problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat different cases as though
they were the same? A working legal system must therefore be willing to pick out key
similarities and to reason from them to the justice of applying a common classification.
Once those similarities are observed, the Court fashions a legal rule in such a way that
it explains the decision of both the source and target cases. The existence of some facts
in common brings into play the general rule.” [34, p. 3]
The focus on judging relevant similarities in Levi’s process implies that legal rules have
an additional dynamic quality, not accounted for in mechanical jurisprudence: Both the
general rules and their ingredient terms change as they are applied over time in different
contexts [34,49]. The rule’s terms may be the same, “but the scope of the rule of law, and
therefore its meaning, depends on what facts will be considered similar to those present
when the rule was first announced” [34, p. 2] [emphasis added]. By contrast, mechanical
jurisprudence does not involve judging similarity or changing rules.
In describing the McPherson decision, Levi focused on Cardozo’s judgments of
similarity concerning the preceding cases in interpreting the rules.
“As to the cases, Cardozo recognized that the early ones ‘suggest a narrow construction
of the rule’. He had reference to the boiler and balance-wheel cases. But . . . [t]hey
could be distinguished because there the manufacturer had . . . pointed out the defect. . . .
Other cases showed that it was not necessary to be destructive in order to be dangerous.
‘A large coffee urn. . .may have within itself, if negligently made, the potency of danger,
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yet no one thinks of it as an implement whose normal function is destruction’. And
‘what is true of the coffee urn is equally true of bottles of aerated water. Devlin v. Smith
was important too. ‘A scaffold’, Cardozo pointed out, ‘is not inherently a dangerous
instrument’. He admitted that the scaffold and the coffee urn cases may have extended
the rule of Thomas v. Winchester’, but ‘if so, this court is committed to the extension’.”
[34, p. 22]
For Levi, case comparisons and changing similarity judgments are intimately connected
to his three stages in the development of legal concepts. First, a concept is created “as cases
are compared”. Second, for a time the “concept is more or less fixed”, and courts reason by
example “to classify items inside and out of the concept”. Third, the concept breaks down.
Courts reject the concept as it interferes with the reclassification of the cases [34, pp. 8–9].
Given the dynamic and plastic nature of legal concepts, their failure to support purely
deductive tests, and tendency at certain stages to lead to arbitrary classifications, one might
ask where is the reasoning? The answer is in the case comparisons. During the history
of erosion in the requirement of privity, for example, cases were compared in terms of
whether:
• the manufacturer had fraudulently hidden the defect,
• the likelihood that an object would be used by third parties,
• how difficult it was to discover the defect,
• who had control of the object,
• how dangerous the object was,
• whether the danger was because of some additional act by the user,
• the nature of the injury resulting from the defect,
• social expectations regarding the degree to which users must rely on the manufacturer
(e.g., drug manufacturer, auto manufacturer).
These are sensible criteria (or factors) in terms of which to compare cases in considering
how the legal system should respond to the increasing problem of third-party injuries
caused by products manufactured and distributed in an increasingly extended industrialized
society. The courts discover these factors as they consider and compare the disputes before
them. As changes occur in what technology affords and what society wants, courts focus on
different collections of these criteria and accord them different significance as they judge
similarity among cases.
These changing judgments of similarity can even lead to a retrospective reinterpretation
of a prior case. What a case stands for (its legal rule) is often determined by how it is
applied in future cases, that is, to what new cases its facts are later deemed similar. As
indicated above, Thomas v. Winchester is an example of a case that had been reinterpreted.
The dissenting judge in the McPherson case characterized Thomas as standing for a narrow
exception to the requirement of privity. Justice Cardozo for the majority in McPherson
states, however, “The defendant argues that things inherently dangerous to life are poisons,
explosives, deadly weapons, things whose normal function is to injure and destroy. But
whatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it has no longer that
restricted meaning” [34, p. 22] [emphasis added].
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In machine learning terms, it is clear that judging relevant similarities in the context
of a new target case and modifying the meanings of the rule’s terms accordingly as one
decides that case, is also a kind of lazy learning. Interestingly, Levi’s example of legal
reasoning, in which courts compare cases, is an example of a much less well-guided lazy
learning approach than the factor-guided approach of the Estus bankruptcy example. In
fact, the examples of legal reasoning illustrate a spectrum in terms of (at least attempted)
supervisory constraint on subsequent courts, from no explicit constraints (i.e., comparing
cases on their facts as in Levi’s example) to specifying factors for guiding case-based
comparison (e.g., the Estus doctrine), to specifying a rule for guiding inference where
cases supplement the rule’s predicates (e.g., Congress’s revision of the bankruptcy statute
in light of the Estus line of cases or the Home Office deduction infra) to specifying a rule
to control logical inference with no case comparisons (i.e., mechanical jurisprudence).
4.2. Relevant similarities and reflective adjustment
In Levi’s model, the engine of gradual conceptual change involves courts’ judgments of
what items are similar. What counts as relevantly similar may change over time, driven by
societal changes and an adversarial legal system where advocates urge similarities to suit
their clients’ positions.
The question arises, however, whether there are any constraints on the determinations
of similarity. At any given time why are some similarities and differences legally relevant
and others not? Levi’s account has been criticized for not specifying any normative criteria
for assessing similarity and relevance.
“Everything is a little bit similar to, or different from, everything else. Perhaps better:
Everything is similar in infinite ways to everything else, and also different from
everything else in the same number of ways. At the very least one needs a set of criteria
to engage in analogical reasoning. Otherwise one has no idea what is analogous to
what.” [61, p. 774]
Interestingly, just as Levi’s account has been criticized for not specifying a constraining
theory of relevant similarities, lazy learning approaches have also been criticized as overly
sensitive to irrelevant features [39].
Recently, two legal philosophers, Cass Sunstein and Scott Brewer, have attempted
to address this lack by providing a theoretical underpinning for the concept of relevant
similarities and a process called “reflective adjustment” for discovering them. Brewer,
in particular, specifies some constraints on the form of analogical legal arguments.
Well-formed arguments should pick out the key similarities, fashion them into a rule-
like explanation of the analogy, and provide reasons why the similarities matter. The
rule-like explanations (called “Analogy-Warranting Rules” or AWR’s) are fairly specific
principles or legal norms that epitomize the factual analogy in terms of the relevant
similarities. The accompanying reasons (called “Analogy-Warranting Rationales” or
AWRa’s) explain why the similarities matter in terms of the purposes of the governing
law [15, pp. 971, 975]. Together, these comprise a “teleological” argument in support of
the decision, one incorporating the purposes underlying the decision [12, p. 50]; [27].
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Brewer describes an abductive process,2 by which the analogy-warranting rule and the
accompanying reasons become the basis for determining which similarities and differences
are relevant.
The analogy-warranting rules and reasons are generated in the process of reflective
adjustment. It is an iterative process of fitting the new problem and the analogy-warranting
rule into the patchwork of past case decisions, AWR’s, abstract principles and general
purposes the legal rules are intended to serve, as well as the partial theories reconciling
the rules and past case decisions.3 Sunstein and Brewer emphasize the importance of
comparing cases to spur conceptualizing about relevant similarities, analogy-warranting
rules, and reasons in the context of specific problems. One abduces the analogy-warranting
rules and reasons as one compares the problem situation and past cases’ facts in light of
the principles, purposes, and partial theories.
[A]n abduced AWR might be rejected because . . . it does not, as applied to some
particular cases, cohere sufficiently with explanatory and justificatory rationales that
the reasoner is unwilling to amend. Or the AWR might be so compelling that the
reasoner chooses to hold onto the AWR and effect a modification of the rationales. . . .
[A]n abduced AWR . . . [may turn] out to yield particular results that are, at least prima
facie, unacceptable to the reasoner. Here again, two kinds of adjustment are possible—
revision of the AWR (and, if necessary, the AWRa [i.e., underlying rationale or reason])
to accommodate the rejection of this application of the AWR, or holding fast to the
AWR (and AWRa) while revising the judgment that the application of the AWR in the
contemplated particular cases is, all things considered, unacceptable. [15, p. 1023]
Brewer also provides for disanalogy-warranting rules and rationales. A DWR picks out
unshared features in the superficially similar source and target cases, which justify the
conclusion that they be treated differently from a legal viewpoint [15, p. 965, 1010f].4
As an example of this fairly complex kind of legal reasoning, Sunstein shows a reasoner
posing analogies to frame and assess a legal analysis. Excerpts of his example are shown
in Fig. 1; we supply formatting cues to help convey the analytical structure. The example
concerns the issue of cross-burning, based on R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992).
2
“More schematically, we may reconstruct the basic pattern of abductive inference as follows:
(1) P—a reasoner identifies some explanandum, an item that has been noticed and, according to the reasoner’s
interests, calls for explanation;
(2) If H then P—the reasoner further observes that if hypothesis H were correct, it would be an adequate
explanans for P;
(3) Therefore, H—the reasoner settles on H for the purpose of confirming or disconfirming it.” [15, p. 948]
3 While reflective adjustment appears to be one way judges reason, there certainly are others and its theoretical
significance is a matter of jurisprudential dispute [6].
4 Explanation-based techniques for determining whether unshared features are important have been developed
in other case-based contexts such as medicine [32].
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No. Statement of proposition Support or attack by analogyI. “Cross-burning is action, not speech, and is therefore
outside of the First Amendment altogether. . . . To
claim constitutional protection, a person must be
saying or writing words.”
← To disconfirm, analogize to flag-burning cases. U.S. v. Eich-
man; Texas v. Johnson (Rejecting claim that flag-burning as mode
of expression is not fully protected under First Amendment).
II. “Content-neutral restrictions on acts that qualify as
speech are generally permissible”, such as ordinary
criminal trespass law.
→ To confirm, analogize to trespass cases. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner
(Finding no First Amendment right to distribute on shopping mall
property handbills concerning Vietnam).
III. “Acts that qualify as speech can be regulated if they
produce anger or resentment”, as in hypothetical law
(A): It is a crime to “place on public or private
property a symbol, including but not limited to a
burning cross or a Nazi swastika, which one knows
or has reason to know arouses anger or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, or creed”.
← To disconfirm, analogize to flag-burning cases and See Ter-
miniello v. Chicago (Conviction of petitioner under ordinance con-
strued as permitting conviction if his speech stirred people to
anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of un-
rest held in violation of First Amendment).
→ Leads to modified proposition IIIa
IIIa. “Acts that qualify as speech can be regulated if they
produce anger or resentment on the basis of race,
color, or creed”, as in hypothetical law (A).
← To disconfirm, analogize to Terminiello v. Chicago (Convic-
tion violated First Amendment even though speech on behalf of
Christian Nationalism incited mob anger against Jews, Commu-
nists). “Unless the legal analogies are to be rejected, defenders of
the ban on cross-burning must concede that” hypothetical law (A)
“is unconstitutional”.
→ Leads to posing more restrictive statute and new proposition IV
IV. “Unprotected acts of expression may be regulated by
the state as it wishes”, as in hypothetical law (B):
Prohibits expressive conduct “that produces anger or
resentment if and only if the speech in question is
regulable under existing doctrines as ‘incitement’ or
‘fighting words’ ”.
← To disconfirm, analogize to hypothetical counterexamples:
“Imagine that the state attempted to regulate only those ‘fighting
words’ directed at Republicans or at whites. . .”.
→ Leads to replacement of Proposition IV with general princi-
ple V
V. “Unprotected acts of expression may not be regu-
lated on the basis of viewpoint” as attempted in Hy-
pothetical law (B)
← To disconfirm, distinguish Hypothetical law (B) from certain
clear-cut cases: “the ordinance is different from those in the clear
cases of viewpoint discrimination. . . . the locality has not drawn a
line between prohibited and permitted points of view. . . . If cross-
burning were all that it banned, we would have a case of viewpoint
discrimination, because cross-burning has a particular viewpoint.
But here the class of prohibited speech is far broader”.
VI. “If government singles out unprotected acts of ex-
pression for regulation when they cause ‘anger or re-
sentment on the basis of race, color, or creed’, [as
in Hypothetical law (B)] it does not discriminate on
any impermissible ground.”
→ To support (VI) analogize to “fighting words” cases: “they show
that regulation of ‘fighting words’ is not by itself impermissibly
viewpoint-based or otherwise objectionable”.
← To attack (VI) distinguish from analogous “fighting word”
cases: “the hypothetical ordinance is not a general proscription of
fighting words. It reflects a decision to single out a certain category
of ‘fighting words’, defined in terms of audience reactions to
speech about certain topics. . . . As a class, they appear to occupy
a point somewhere between viewpoint-based restrictions and
content-neutral ones”.
→ To support (VI) analogize to bans on hate speech: “Supplemen-
tal criminal penalties for racially-motivated ‘hate crimes’ seem to
be a part of current law; indeed, many states have enacted some
form of hate crime legislation that enhances penalties for acts mo-
tivated by racial hatred. . .”.
Fig. 1. Example of analogical legal reasoning adapted from Sunstein [61].
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The main point of the example is the structure of the analysis: a series of propositions
whose validity is assessed in light of analogous cases, which leads to revising the
propositions and testing with more analogies. Thus, the reasoner starts with the proposition
that cross-burning is action, not speech covered by the First Amendment [61, pp. 759–
767] and through a series of analogical reasoning steps, reaches the tentative conclusion
in VI that cross-burning is expressive action, which may still be subject to government
regulation. The analogical reasoning steps include analogizing to and distinguishing from
positive and negative case examples, real and hypothetical.
Sunstein’s example may be compared to a hypothetical tutoring discourse composed by
the mathematician Imre Lakatos, in which students ponder the definition of a geometrical
solid. Given a conjectural definition of a polyhedron, students pose examples and
counterexamples, including “monster” counterexamples that lead the students to monster-
barring revisions to the definition [33, pp. 7–53]. In a fairly analogous way, as illustrated
in Fig. 1, comparing legal analogies suggests reasonable propositions and principles, tests
them, leads to modifications and sometimes to plausible, tentative conclusions. In fact, this
sort of dialectic is ubiquitous [44].
It is also possible to characterize the relevant similarities and differences in Sunstein’s
example in terms of factors. The speech-prohibiting regulations and their applications
in such cases as the flag-burning cases, shopping mall trespass cases, the “Republican”
fighting-words hypothetical, and cases involving political advertising in buses, or presiden-
tial threats are compared in terms of factors. In this domain concerning the constitutionality
of regulating expressive conduct, the factors occur at a somewhat higher level of abstrac-
tion than in the previous examples involving bankruptcy good faith or privity in product
liability. They include the expressiveness of the regulated conduct, the similarity of the reg-
ulation to ordinary criminal regulations, the extent that the regulation is viewpoint-based,
and the breadth of the class of speech regulated. As the reasoner compares the target prob-
lem to the real and hypothetical cases cited in the example’s analogies and distinctions, the
similarities and differences appear and are evaluated in light of the underlying principles.
One may imagine how the legal significance of these similarities and differences, and the
underlying principles, may change, for instance, as a society perceives an increasing threat
to security from terrorism.
The differences between the pretense of legal reasoning and reasoning by example in
law (i.e., Levi’s changing similarity judgments and the abduction of rules and reasons
underlying relevant similarities and differences) evidence an adaptive mechanism not
accounted for in mechanical jurisprudence or even in the version-space accounts. As what
constitutes a relevant similarity or difference changes over time, along with the reasons for
their significance, so do the rules of law and even the significance of the cases. The rules
(and cases) are subject to interpretation and re-interpretation, both implicitly and explicitly.
Their meanings change as the rules are applied.
4.3. Reflective adjustment as lazy learning
Reflective adjustment is one important way in which judges reason in deciding
particular cases. In its tendency to defer conceptualization of past cases until decision
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making in a particular new case, reflective adjustment, according to Levi’s model as
modified by Sunstein and Brewer, often has similarities to a process of lazy learning.
As noted above, courts’ lazy learning may be contrasted with the eager learning of
legislative rule-making. Legislatures construct rules for deciding cases not yet seen. Courts
may sometimes do that, too. But only courts can reinterpret and modify those rules in the
process of applying them in deciding a new case. Courts may reinterpret the rules to address
novel factual scenarios in light of changing social realities and, in the process, annotate
the rules with cases embodying their interpretive gloss. In interpreting rules, courts may
change the rules structurally, or change the meaning of a rule’s terms by adjusting their
judgments of what cases are relevantly similar, or abduce new analogy-warranting rules to
relate the new decision to, and reconcile it with, past cases, principles, purposes and partial
theories.
Legislatures may attempt to constrain courts’ ability to change rules by increasing a
rule’s specificity. As noted above, the legislature may even tailor a rule to deal with a
specific case it deems to have been wrongly decided by a court. But in applying such a
rule, a court is free to reinterpret it in the context of the next such case it decides.
The legal philosopher Fred Schauer illustrates the tensions underlying such attempts
at constraining judicial discretion within the context of mandatory sentencing guidelines.
If one gives judges highly detailed rules with little discretion, they tend to loosen
their application by finding exceptional cases to which the rules do not apply. In a
complementary way, if one gives judges broad standards with lots of discretion the judges
tend to tighten the rules to cover a narrower set of prototypical cases [57].
While reflective adjustment is similar to a learning process, it is not obvious that a
version space model can account for the additional interpretive dynamics in the abduction
of legal rules and reasons. Version space approaches are “not robust . . . to situations in
which the unknown target concept is not expressible in the provided hypothesis space”
[38, p. 46]. Although one can identify general principles, purposes, and partial theories
that apply in a legal domain, one cannot represent in advance all of the interpretive
alternatives in a legal hypothesis space. In law (as elsewhere) the hypothesis space seems to
be discovered over time in a process of comparing new case and old, a process of reflective
adjustment. It probably is impossible to anticipate how the general principles, purposes,
partial theories, and past cases will be applied, conceptualized and reconciled in new fact
situations.
In a legal system, one needs to manipulate the rules in a version space manner at the
same time as one manipulates the concept hierarchy underpinning the version space. For
instance, compare the two rules at the end of Section 3, the rule of the MacPherson case,
summarizing the development of product liability law, and the modern rule in §402A of the
Restatement, Second, Torts. On close inspection, the former does not go quite as far as the
latter: the former covers only the subset of dangerous only if defective items for which the
danger can be foreseen. In addition, a prerequisite like “used by third party without tests”
has been added to the privity exception rule. Even more significantly, under Section 402A
a manufacturer may be liable to third parties even if it has exercised all possible care (i.e.,
was not negligent in manufacturing the defective item).
Thus, as in the other cases in this episode, the manipulation of the rule with respect
to the classes of items it covers is occurring at the same time as manipulation of the
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hierarchy of classes. In fact, to model Cardozo’s rule accurately the hierarchy needs to
be modified to insert the category of items for which danger can be foreseen between
the inherently dangerous and dangerous only if defective categories. This need for
simultaneous manipulation of the rules in a version space and of the concept hierarchy
underpinning it is typical of the law as a learning system and has been remarked on in
other legal domains [49]. It is even a hallmark of the growth of mathematics [33,44]. There
is an intimate intertwining in the evolution of rules and their ingredient concepts.
5. The HYPO model, lazy learning, and reflective adjustment
Case-based reasoning can be seen as a lazy learning method to classify new problems
by “analyzing similar instances while ignoring instances that are very different from the
query” [38, p. 240]. In particular, the HYPO family of case-based reasoning (CBR) models
offers a lazy learning approach to modeling legal reasoning. Systems in the HYPO family
include HYPO [3,4,9], CABARET [52], BankXX [53, 54], and CATO [2,7]. These systems
have dealt with a variety of legal and other domains, including misappropriation of trade
secrets (HYPO, CATO), tax law (CABARET), and bankruptcy (BankXX). From the CBR
point of view, all of these systems are “interpretive” systems, as opposed to “problem
solving” systems [31, p. 86].
These programs represent legal cases so that the decision about how to “generalize
beyond the training data” can be deferred until a new problem is observed. We think of the
arguments as being the generalizations since they, in effect, provide what we can call, after
Brewer, “analogy-warranting rules” for explaining the analogy between the problem and
a past case or cases, and also rationales for why the analogy matters legally. Formulating
such arguments is an interpretive step, performed when the new case is observed, in which
a program makes an analysis to show or argue why the new problem should be decided in
the same way as similar cases and differently from dissimilar ones.
The interpretive step is a kind of reflective adjustment. Indeed, computational models
of case-based legal reasoning can be seen as attempts to model a process of reflective
adjustment. As depicted in the “argumentation pyramid” of Fig. 2, ideally the models
represent a hierarchy of legal knowledge, from the facts of cases of a particular type at
the bottom to the principles and purposes of that legal domain at the top [5]. In the middle
are the statutory rules governing a particular type of legal claim, such as a claim of trade
secret misappropriation or a claim of nonpayment of taxes, the rules’ predicates, including
the claim’s basic elements or requirements, and court-made theories or tests for analyzing
such predicates. Finally, there is some kind of bridge between the facts of cases and the
rules’ predicates. Only recently have computational models begun to represent and apply
the top-level principles and purposes,5 neither HYPO nor any of its progeny has so far
done so.
5 One such approach is described in [11].
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Different models use different approaches to bridge the gap between case facts and rule
predicates.6 In the HYPO family of systems, the fundamental mechanisms for doing this
are “dimensions” and “factors”. Dimensions were introduced in HYPO [3,4,55]. Factors
were developed in CATO [2,7].
HYPO-style dimensions capture the knowledge that certain sets of facts enable one to
approach a legal dispute in a particular way and that certain changes in these facts tend
to strengthen or weaken the claim of a side in a legal case (i.e., plaintiff or defendant).
Dimensions employ a range of values along which the balance of strength may shift
from one side to the other. CATO-style factors are related to dimensions in that they also
represent stereotypical patterns of facts that tend to strengthen or weaken a side’s legal
claim, but they do not use a range of values or reason about any shifts in strength. Rather,
factors represent situations that are assumed to be clear. When a factor is applicable to a
problem, it automatically represents a strength for a side. HYPO-style dimensions can be
viewed as a methodology for representing CATO-style factors in detail [48].
So, for instance, one way to approach a dispute concerning trade secret misappropriation
is to focus on the number of disclosures of the alleged trade secret made by the plaintiff
(the one who complains that his secret has been taken by defendant). Ceteris paribus, the
more times that the plaintiff has voluntarily disclosed the secret, the weaker is his claim that
the defendant has misappropriated the secret, or equivalently, the stronger is a defendant’s
argument that he is not liable for misappropriation. Plaintiff’s position is strongest where
he made zero disclosures; far weaker is 600 or 6000 disclosures, in which case, arguably,
6 For instance, semantic networks representing “criterial facts” in a court’s explanation have been employed
to bridge statutory predicates and case facts in Workman’s Compensation cases [13,14]. Prototypes and
deformations, a representation combining template-like descriptions of legal concepts (e.g., taxable income) and
a set of possible mappings from one fact description into others, were used in [35].
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the secret is not so secret anymore. This is the basis of the dimension called “Secrets-
Disclosed-Outsiders” [4, p.108f].
In HYPO, dimensions related case facts to a legal claim as a whole (i.e., trade secret
misappropriation). In CATO, factors link case facts to the elemental issues of a legal claim.
In CABARET and BankXX, systems which operated in statutory domains, dimensions
were related to individual statutory predicates.
The designers of the HYPO family learned, or acquired, the dimensions second hand, by
reading textual sources. In legal opinions, judges may describe a pattern of facts in a case
and state that it strengthens the claim, or they may cite a line of cases focusing on similar
fact patterns in other cases. They may even provide a list of factors as in our Estus example.
In law journal articles or legal treatises, authors may discuss the fact patterns and group
exemplary cases in footnotes or string cites, sometimes noting cases that are exceptions to
the expected impact of the patterns. Statutes, regulations, and authoritative commentaries
like restatements of law may list factors relevant to a claim or legal predicate, and even
provide hypothetical examples.
Ideally, as suggested in the argumentation pyramid of Fig. 2, computational models of
legal reasoning implement algorithms for bringing principles, rule predicates, dimensions,
factors or other bridging representations, and cases to bear on analyzing a particular
problem. HYPO and its progeny do so in a manner of reflective adjustment because their
arguments interpret existing statutory rules or pose analogy-warranting rules explaining
relevant similarities and differences between a problem dispute and past cases.
For instance, in HYPO these mechanisms are used to produce points, counterpoints, and
rebuttals in so-called “3-ply” legal arguments as well as to pose telling hypotheticals that
test the strengths and expose the weakness of arguments relevant to the case at hand in a
common law domain. In CATO, a tutoring program designed to teach law students how to
perform tasks associated with reflective adjustment, these algorithms are designed either to
automate some of the tasks, such as arguing that a problem case is relevantly similar to or
different from a past case, or to help students/humans learn to perform these tasks well. In
CABARET, such mechanisms were used to reason with or establish specific rules and their
constituent predicates in a statutory context. In BankXX, such mechanisms were used to
direct heuristic search for gathering information about a dozen key “argument pieces”, such
as best supporting case and applicable legal theories, needed to argue whether a problem
case satisfies a statutory requirement.
5.1. HYPO
To understand the HYPO model in concert with other models, we briefly review how
HYPO works, especially in the initial analysis and retrieval steps [4]. To simplify the
description we speak only of dimensions, but the same description applies to systems like
CATO that employ factors. HYPO-style systems begin their processing as follows:
(1) Analysis. After a problem case—often called the “current fact situation” or “cfs”—
is input (typically by filling in a frame-based representation), the problem case
is analyzed for applicable dimensions. As mentioned above, a dimension has
prerequisites that must be satisfied in order for the dimension to apply to a case, in
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which case it is called “applicable”. If all but a focal prerequisite are met, it is called a
“near miss”. During the course of this analysis step, both the applicable and near miss
dimensions for the cfs are identified.
(2) Retrieval. Based on this analysis, any case in the Case Base that shares at least one
of its applicable dimensions with those of the cfs is deemed minimally relevant and is
retrieved. Dimensions shared by a case and cfs are defined as “relevant similarities”.
Retrieval can also be done with respect to overlap with the union of the applicable and
near miss dimensions of the cfs.
(3) Sorting. This set of retrieved cases is then sorted into a “claim lattice” that imposes a
partial order on the retrieved cases according to the inclusion relation on the subsets of
dimensions that these retrieved cases share with those applicable in the cfs. Thus, if the
subset of dimensions that Case A shares with the set of applicable dimensions of the
cfs includes those that Case B does, A is said to be “more on-point” (i.e., A B). An
“extended claim lattice” does the same thing but with the cases that have any overlap
with the set of applicable and near miss dimensions of the cfs.
(4) Positioning. In effect, the claim lattice organizes cases from the Case Base with respect
to the cfs. From the claim lattice the “most on point” (“mopc”) and “best” cases
are selected. Most on-point cases are those retrieved cases that are maximal in the
relevancy sorting. That is, they lie in the root node or in the immediate children of
the root. A case in the root node is said to “be on all fours” with the cfs since every
dimension relevant to the cfs is also relevant to the case. Note that the selection of
mopc’s does not take into account which side won the retrieved case. This is addressed
next in the selection of “best” cases.
Fig. 3. Dimensional comparison of cfs (i.e., the Mason case) and two other cases.
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The Venn diagram in Fig. 3 illustrates the concept of “more on-point”. It shows a
dimensional comparison of a cfs, called the Mason case,7 and two other cases, the Crown
case and the Boeing case. Each case is represented as a set of applicable dimensions. The
Crown case is relevant to the cfs; they share dimension F1. Boeing, however, is more on
point than Crown relative to the cfs; the set of factors Crown shares with the cfs, {F1}, is
a subset of the set of dimensions Boeing shares with the cfs, {F1, F6, F21}. As discussed
below, these relationships correspond to arguments. In particular, since Boeing, unlike
Crown, was won by plaintiff, Boeing trumps Crown in the following sense. If the defendant
sites the Crown case as a reason why defendant should win in the cfs, plaintiff can trump
that point by citing Boeing as a more-on-point counterexample.
The claim lattice for this cfs can be shown as a kind of Hasse diagram; see Fig. 4. The
cfs (i.e., the Mason case) resides in the root node of the claim lattice. All of the other cases
in the claim lattice share at least one dimension in common with the cfs; they are ordered
in terms of on-pointness. The Boeing case in Node 6 is more-on-point than the Crown case
in Node 7. The Forest Laboratories case in Node 5 is more-on-point than either Boeing or
Crown. The Televation case in Node 2, however, is not more-on-point than either Boeing
or Crown, even though it is closer to the root node. Since neither of the sets of dimensions
the Boeing or Crown cases share with the cfs is a subset of that of the Televation case, the
7 Here are the facts of the Mason case: Tony Mason, the plaintiff, developed a cocktail he dubbed “Lynchburg
Lemonade”. Since Mason took some measures to protect his recipe’s secrecy, and since his was the only tavern
producing this drink, we say factors F6, Security-Measures, and F15, Unique-Product, apply; both tend to favor
the plaintiff (p). On the other hand, Mason disclosed his recipe in negotiations with a sales agent of the defendant,
Jack Daniel’s Distillery, which started marketing the cocktail without compensating Mason. Thus, F1, Disclosure-
In-Negotiations, applies, a factor that tends to favor the defendant (d). The agent was aware, however, that the
recipe was a “secret formula”, so F21, Knew-Info-Confidential, also applies, tending to favor the plaintiff. Finally,
the recipe could have been obtained by reverse engineering the cocktail; F16, Info-Reverse-Engineerable, applies
and favors the defendant.
38 K.D. Ashley, E.L. Rissland / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 17–58
cases are not comparable to Televation; the latter case lies on a different branch in the claim
lattice.
There are some subtle differences between the definitions of best cases in the various
HYPO-style systems, but the essential idea is that best cases are mopc’s that are good
for the point of view of the side being argued for in the cfs. In the original HYPO
definition, a best case is (i) a mopc; (ii) that was decided for the point-of-view being taken
in the analysis; and (iii) that has at least one dimension whose applicability is tagged as
advantageous to the point-of-view taken in the analysis.8
These initial steps perform HYPO-style case-based retrieval, sorting, and positioning of
cases. Further steps in HYPO-style systems create arguments or otherwise reason about the
problem case or use the information garnered to do other tasks, like information retrieval.
In particular, all HYPO-style systems can use information in the claim lattice to make
arguments about the cfs. For example, given the claim lattice for the Mason case in
Fig. 4, HYPO could make an argument that where plaintiff took security measures (F6)
and the defendant knew the information was confidential (F21), plaintiff should win even
though plaintiff disclosed the information in negotiations with the defendant (F1), as was
the case in Boeing. HYPO could also respond to that point by distinguishing the Boeing
case from the cfs on behalf of the defendant, pointing out relevant differences. “Relevant
differences” are defined as unshared dimensions, or certain differences in location on a
shared dimension, that warrant deciding the cfs differently from the cited case. The three
dashes after the Boeing case in Node 6 of Fig. 4 indicate that there are three unshared
factors that amount to distinctions.
All HYPO-style systems implement a “lazy” approach since they defer making
arguments how to decide a problem until the programs have positioned a cfs with respect
to similar past cases. In making such arguments, all of them support a kind of reflective
adjustment. They fit the new problem into a patchwork of past case decisions, comparing
cases in order to reason about the legal significance of the relevant similarities and
differences.
One might imagine it possible to apply an automated approach to learning the weights
of known factors. Lazy learning approaches in machine learning invite the use of weighting
schemes.
“As noted, a lazy learning method requires a similarity measure, to evaluate the
importance of examples, for classifying an unseen instance. If examples are described
by a real-valued vector, then similarity could e.g. be measured by the usual vector
distance, which raises the question, if all attributes should have the same impact. To
reduce the unbeneficial impact of irrelevant attributes, and to assign each attribute the
proper degree of impact, are key issues, using this method.” [39]
8 In CABARET, best cases need only satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). BankXX uses a definition that is similar
to CABARET’s, but with a change in condition (i) to require that a best case be a maximal case of those decided
for the point of view. Note under the original HYPO definition it is possible for there to be no best cases; the
definition of BankXX only produces no best cases if there are no cases at all for the point of view.
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In making case-based arguments, however, HYPO eschews quantitative approaches
to dealing with the weights of factors. The concept of weights in legal argument is
problematic from a variety of legal, philosophical, and technical standpoints. Judges do not
use weights explicitly, and there is no authoritative scheme in law for assigning weights.
Efforts to learn the weights by statistical analysis founder on the problem that the available
cases represent a skewed sample. There is also the problem of determining exactly what the
weights mean. Combining numerical weights throws information away. Most importantly,
the weights are not context sensitive. While one factor may often be more important than
another, inevitably there are contexts in which the reverse is true [10]. Although some work
in AI has focused on developing context-sensitive weighting schemes [1], it is not clear
whether or how the work applies to domain tasks involving law, explanation, or argument.
The difficulty of assigning weights to dimensions and factors in particular contexts—
and the near impossibility of learning context independent ones—is one of the reasons
why a process of reflective adjustment is necessary. Heuristic approaches involving posing
hypotheticals to explore the significance of dimensions and factors are important in
reflective adjustment. They provide a way to deal symbolically with the problem of
assessing the significance of strengths and weaknesses that cannot be represented as
quantitative weights.
Analysis of law school and Supreme Court hypotheticals shows how experts test the
relative importance of dimensions by creating a “heuristic constellation” of cases, a set
of closely related hypotheticals, in a space spanned by the dimensions [43,45,47]. For in-
stance, to assess the relative importance of the “Inherently-Mobile-In-Case-Of-Exigency”
versus the “Expectation-Of-Privacy-In-Use-As-Home” dimensions in a 4th Amendment
warrantless search case, the Justices of the US Supreme Court created a large number of
hypos like a “great big stretch Cadillac with curtains and a bed”, “a houseboat docked with
no motor but hooked up to utilities right beside a house”, “a trailer without a tractor, parked
up on blocks in an RV park”, etc. They used these to explore how to handle the case of a
motor home, a paradigmatic clash of the doctrines that apply to houses and cars [45].
The HYPO program implemented heuristics for hypothetically varying the problem fact
situation to explore “weights” of factors symbolically [3]; [4, pp. 122–123]; [47]. For
instance, given a problem in which the plaintiff disclosed its secrets to some number of
outsiders but made the disclosures subject to confidentiality restrictions, it could test the
limits of the restrictions by increasing the number of disclosees to some arbitrarily large
number. If millions of people had the “secret” is it still a secret even if they all promise not
to tell? This is a realistic problem in an age of mass-marketed software.
In making arguments, certain HYPO descendants make particularly clear that these
arguments embody or interpret rules for deciding the problem, rules or interpretations
the programs generate only after the programs encounter the problem. In particular,
CABARET and CATO make explicit these “lazily-constructed” analogy-warranting rules
and interpretations.
5.2. CABARET
CABARET reasoned about statutory rules and their constituent predicates and the
precedent cases that could be used to argue that these were—or were not—satisfied in
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a problem case. It operated in the statutory area concerning the so-called “home office
deduction” in US tax law. It used HYPO-style mechanisms in concert with additional rule-
based ones and a computational model of statutory argument to produce the underpinnings
of an argument meshing both rules and cases [52,60]. For instance, if a statutory predicate
were needed to satisfy the last of a rule’s antecedents (i.e., a rule-based near miss),
CABARET would focus on establishing the missed antecedent with case-based methods.
CABARET’s three-tiered model of statutory interpretation focused on relevant similar-
ities and differences by taking into account the point-of-view of the arguer, the apparent
status of the rule on the problem case, and its status in past cases. The top tier contains four
argument stances: (1) broaden a rule that on its face does not hold but that one wants to
hold in the problem case; (2) discredit a rule that does seem to apply and that one doesn’t
want to; (3) confirm that a rule establishes a desired conclusion, (4) confirm that a rule fails
to establish an undesired conclusion:
Rule conditions met Rule conditions not
in problem case met in problem case
Pro Confirm the hit Broaden the rule
Con Discredit the rule Confirm the miss
From [60, p. 82].
The second tier contains tactics—called argument moves—to carry out the stances. Four
moves are possible for each stance. The cases available in the case base determine which
ones are applicable.
Argument stances take into account the status of a rule on the problem case; argument
moves take into account the status on cases in CABARET’s case base. Argument moves
are ultimately carried out with HYPO-style primitives like distinguishing and analogizing,
which form the third level.
5.3. CATO
Since reflective adjustment serves an important philosophical and practical role, from a
pedagogical viewpoint, it is important to teach law students how to perform this process
well. If modeling the process directly as a machine learning process is still too complex,
can computational models perform a useful role in teaching the process [5]? Can an
Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) help students learn a process of interpretation that
basically defers conceptualization to the context of the particular problem? Law schools
already teach the process to students (who, as quintessential lazy learners, are happy to
defer conceptualization as long as possible). Can an ITS help law schools teach students to
construct local generalizations in light of specific facts, past cases, partial theories of those
cases, and general principles and purposes in the legal domain? Can it help perform this
interpretive task from multiple conflicting viewpoints in the service of making arguments,
so that students can take advantage of factual strengths while anticipating weaknesses?
As a tutoring system, CATO has several mechanisms to help teach students the skills
of making and responding to arguments for deciding problems, formulating analogy-
warranting rules and supplying rationales for them [6]. Specifically, CATO employs
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Template for Analogizing/Conflict-Resolution Move: Recipe for Downplaying Distinction:
[a] Where 〈Insert factors strengthening plaintiff’s
[defendant’s] claim shared by cfs and source
case〉,
1. Recite reasons why distinction d may matter in the
cfs [source case].
[b] even though 〈Insert factors weakening plain-
tiff’s [defendant’s] claim shared by cfs and
source case〉, 〈Insert plaintiff [defendant]〉
should win a claim of trade secret misappro-
priation, as in 〈Insert name and cite of source
case〉.
2. Recite factors in cfs [source case] which contrast
with or undercut d (i.e., matter for exactly the
opposite reason).
3. Recite factors in the source case [cfs] which matter
for the same reason (i.e., are similar to d).
Template for Distinguishing Move: Recipe for Emphasizing Distinction:
〈Insert name of the source case〉 is distin-
guishable. It is stronger for 〈Insert plain-
tiff/defendant〉 than is the current problem.
1. Recite reasons why distinction d matters in the cfs
[source case] which are not contradicted in the cfs
[source case] and not present in the source case
[cfs].
[c] In 〈Insert name of source case〉, 〈Insert extra
factors strengthening plaintiff’s [defendant’s]
claim in source case〉. This was not so in the
current problem.
2. Recite factors in cfs [source case] which are similar
to d (i.e., matter for the same reason).
[d] Also, in the current problem, 〈Insert extra fac-
tors weakening plaintiff’s [defendant’s] claim
in target problem〉. This was not so in 〈Insert
name of source case〉.
3. Recite factors in the source case [cfs] which
contrast with or undercut d (i.e., matter for exactly
the opposite reason) and which are not present in
the cfs [source case].
Fig. 5. Some argument move templates/recipes in CATO.
and presents explicit templates for argument moves like Analogizing/Conflict-Resolution,
which specifies the form of the analogy-warranting rule, and Distinguishing, which shows
how to attack the analogy-warranting rule. CATO also presents and implements algorithms
(in teaching them to law students we refer to them as recipes) for preparing the rationales,
including organizing arguments by issues and downplaying or emphasizing distinctions.
These templates and recipes are illustrated in Fig. 5, based on [2, pp. 71–75, 126, 129,
133]. Finally, CATO presents examples inviting students to generate hypotheses like the
analogy-warranting rules and to test them against the case base.
These mechanisms can be seen at work in the following examples of outputs from the
most recent version of CATO.9 The dialogue in Fig. 6 simulates an argument between
TV attorney arch-rivals, Perry Mason and Hamilton Burger, addressing a judge in court.10
CATO controls the dialogue, the judge, Mr. Burger, who in this example is arguing for
the plaintiff in the Mason case, and Perry’s savvy assistant Della Street, who offers hints.
A student plays the role of Perry Mason, attorney for the defendant in this trade secret
misappropriation case. Students select from a menu argument moves and factors for Mr.
Mason to try when called upon by the judge, as in steps 4 and 5. CATO translates the
9 The dialogue in Fig. 6 was produced by a subsequent version of CATO implemented by University of
Pittsburgh graduate student Ravi Desai, who reworked some of the output-generating code in Vincent Aleven’s
original program. Where necessary, in order to distinguish between these two versions of CATO, the later version
will be called CATO-Dial.
10 For a short refresher course see The Perry Mason Pages, http://www.ozemail.com.au/∼ jsimko/.
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Court is in session. . .1. Della Street (whispering into Perry’s ear): Perry! Thank heaven you are here! The Judge wants to hear
oral arguments on our motion to dismiss on behalf of defendant in Mason v. Jack Daniels Distillery.
2. Judge: Ah Mr. Mason, there you are. Your opponent Mr. Burger is just finishing up an argument for plaintiff.
You may proceed, Mr. Burger.
3. Mr. Burger for Plaintiff (CATO): Your Honor, where plaintiff adopted security measures [F6] and
defendant knew that plaintiff’s information was confidential [F21], even though plaintiff disclosed its
product information in negotiations with defendant [Fl], plaintiff should win a claim of trade secrets
misappropriation, as in The Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d 38, 738 P.2d 665
(1987).
4. Judge (to Defendant’s counsel): Your response, Mr. Mason?
5. <STUDENT (selecting from menu): Distinguish Boeing [F15] [F16] [F18] (Continue)>
Mr. Mason for Defendant (Student): The Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation is distinguishable,
Your Honor, because in Mason, plaintiff’s product information could be learned by reverse-engineering
[F16]. This was not so in Boeing. Boeing is also distinguishable, because in Mason, unlike Boeing,
defendant’s product was identical to plaintiff’s [F18] and plaintiff was the only manufacturer making the
product [F15].
6. Judge (to Plaintiff’s counsel): Mr. Burger?
7. Mr. Burger for Plaintiff (CATO): Your Honor, as Mr. Mason concedes, in the current problem, defendant’s
product was identical to plaintiff’s [F18] and plaintiff was the only manufacturer making the product [F15].
Boeing, which was won by plaintiff, does not have these strengths on plaintiff’s part but is otherwise similar
to the problem at hand. Where these additional strengths are present, a decision in favor of plaintiff is
warranted even more strongly than it was in Boeing.
8. Judge (to Defendant’s counsel): I am sorry, Mr. Mason, but I am afraid I have to agree with Mr. Burger.
9. <STUDENT: Help! (Continue)>
10. Della Street (whispering into Perry’s ear): Here is a hint. Even though factors F18 and F15 are differences,
defendant cannot use them to distinguish Boeing. Defendant needs to focus on other differences, namely, on
those differences that make Mason look stronger for defendant than Boeing.
11. <STUDENT (selecting from menu): Distinguish Boeing [F4][F12] [F14] [F16] (Continue)>
Mr. Mason for Defendant (Student): Boeing is distinguishable, because in Boeing, defendant used
materials that were subject to confidentiality restrictions [F14], plaintiff’s disclosures to outsiders were
subject to confidentiality restrictions [F12], and defendant entered into a nondisclosure agreement with
plaintiff [F4]. This was not so in Mason. Also, in Mason, plaintiff’s product information could be learned by
reverse-engineering [F16]. This was not so in Boeing.
12. Judge (to Plaintiff’s counsel): Mr. Burger?
13. Mr. Burger for Plaintiff (CATO): Uhh. Well, as you know, Your Honor, Boeing, is not the only case we
cite in our brief.
14. Della Street (whispering into Perry’s ear): Brilliant job, Perry!
Fig. 6. Courtroom-style dialogue of CATO-Dial.
student’s menu selections into Perry Mason’s argument, and then responds appropriately
on behalf of Burger and the judge.
The argument in step 3 is an analogy-warranting rule, a rule-like explanation of the
legal analogy between the cfs and past case, the Boeing case. CATO generates this rule-like
explanation only after the cfs is observed. Based on its comparison of the sets of factors
in the two cases (Fig. 3 indicates which factors are relevant similarities and differences)
CATO fills in the Analogizing/Conflict-Resolution Move template in Fig. 5. It is a conflict-
resolution argument move because it cites the Boeing case as an instance where plaintiff
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won even though plaintiff’s claim had a weakness, plaintiff disclosed the information
himself to the defendant (i.e., factor F1).
When the judge turns to Mr. Mason, speaking for the student, in step 4 of the dialogue in
Fig. 6, CATO invites the student to attack Mr. Burger’s proposed analogy-warranting rule
with a distinguishing move, that is, by showing the distinctions between the cfs and Boeing.
The student makes a false start in step 5, selecting two factors (F15 and F18), which though
not shared, are also not useful distinctions because they are reasons why the cfs is stronger
for plaintiff than Boeing, not weaker. Mr. Burger (i.e., CATO) takes the student to task
for this mistake in step 7. As illustrated, the program is smart enough to take advantage
of the weaknesses in Mr. Mason’s (i.e., the student’s) argument, characterizing them as
concessions. But the student gets another chance, and in step 11 succeeds in selecting
useful distinctions, which CATO formulates into a response using Fig. 5’s distinguishing
move template, at which point Mr. Burger concedes.
Since the antagonists may argue about the legal significance of the relevant similarities
and differences (i.e., about the rationale of the analogy-warranting rule, as discussed
below), this need not be the end of the argument. For instance, CATO supports other
argument moves like downplaying or emphasizing a distinction, in which the program
argues from a legal viewpoint, whether a distinction really matters. Instead of conceding,
Mr. Burger might downplay one of the student’s distinctions as in step 13 of Fig. 7.11
Using the downplaying recipe in Fig. 5, CATO recites a reason why distinction F14
matters, that “defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information would be a
breach of confidentiality [F115]”, and recites factors in the cfs which matter for the same
reason, and thus blunt the importance of the supposed distinction. In step 17, Fig. 7, the
student finds a way to respond by emphasizing the importance of F14. This time using
Fig. 5’s emphasizing recipe, CATO recites reasons why distinction F14 matters which
are not contradicted in the cfs and not present in the source case. Such a reason is “that
defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through improper means [F120]”. It
recites factors in the cfs which are similar to F14 (i.e., matter for the same reason) such
as F12. Finally, it recites factors in the source case like F16 that contrast with F14, are not
present in the cfs, and provide an alternative explanation.
An analogy-warranting rule like that in Fig. 6, step 3 can be seen as a hypothesis about
what the law is.12 CATO supports students in testing whether the hypotheses are consistent
with the outcomes of other cases already decided and residing in CATO’s database [2,
p. 111]. A student tests such a hypothesis by running a query like “f1 f6 f21” (i.e., List all
cases with factors F1, Disclosure-in-Negotiations, F6, Security-Measures, and F21, Knew-
Info-Confidential. An implicit “and” requires that all three constraints be satisfied. One can
also specify that certain factors not be present; in CATO queries, “%” means “not”). The
query returns eight pro-plaintiff cases from CATO’s database, and no pro-defendant cases,
11 Although CATO [2, p. 133] and CATO-Dial currently can perform the downplaying and emphasizing moves
in steps 13 and 17 of Fig. 7, CATO-Dial does not otherwise support the dialogue presented in Fig. 7. We present
the moves in the courtroom-style dialogue format to illustrate how they relate to the dialogue in Fig. 6, which
CATO-Dial does support.
12 For instance, in ANAPRON, the “compellingness” of rules generated by analogy was assessed by testing
them against the existing cases in the case base [30].
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Court is in session. . .12. Judge (to Plaintiff’s counsel): Mr. Burger?
13. Mr. Burger for Plaintiff (CATO): Your Honor, in Boeing, defendant used materials that were subject
to confidentiality restrictions [F14]. This was not so in Mason. This however is not a major distinction.
In Mason, defendant knew that plaintiff’s information was confidential [F21]. Therefore, in both cases,
defendant was on notice that using or disclosing the information would be a breach of confidentiality [F115].
14. Judge (to Defendant’s counsel): Mr. Mason? What do you say to that?
15. <STUDENT: Help! (Continue)>
16. Della Street (whispering into Perry’s ear): Mr. Burger just downplayed one of the distinctions. Here is
something that may help. Try emphasizing F14. Try emphasizing F16.
17. <STUDENT (selecting from menu): Emphasize [F14] [F16] (Continue)>
Mr. Mason for Defendant (Student): In Boeing, defendant used materials that were subject to
confidentiality restrictions [F14]. This was not so in Mason. This is a marked distinction. It shows that
in Boeing, defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information through improper means [F120]. This is
supported by other facts in Boeing as well: Plaintiff imposed confidentiality restrictions in connection with
its disclosures to outsiders [F12]. In Mason, on the other hand, defendant obtained or could have obtained its
information by legitimate means [F120]: Plaintiff’s information could be discovered by reverse engineering
plaintiff’s product [F16].
18. Judge (to both counsel): I think I have heard enough to help me make my decision.
Fig. 7. Example of downplaying/emphasizing distinctions.
which appears to confirm the viability of the hypothesis given the existing precedents,
although students still need to read the cases to be sure. Frequently, queries return a mixture
of cases won by plaintiff and defendant, so some of the cases contradict the hypothesis.
In that event, after reading the cases, students may try to find other factors explaining
the decisions in the counterexamples; they can then modify the hypothesis to exclude the
counterexamples.13 If not, students need to abandon the hypothesis in light of the retrieved
cases. This is very similar to the rescuing of a valid conjecture in mathematics, for instance
by “monster-barring” [33]. It is often the case that criticism with a “local” (i.e., to the
proof or rationale) counterexample leaves the truth of the conjecture intact; that is, it is not
a “global” (i.e., to the conjecture) counterexample [33]. Very often, a faulty proof, can be
fixed; a recent example of this is the ‘debugging’ of Wile’s proof of Fermat’s conjecture.
CATO also generates rationales for analogy-warranting rules like that of Fig. 6, step 3
by providing legal reasons why the factors matter. For instance, in downplaying or
emphasizing a distinction, Fig. 7, competing rationales are introduced and contested. These
rationales refer to legal issues and more abstract factors (denoted in Fig. 7 by three-digit F
numbers). The Factor Hierarchy represents the connections between factors and the legal
issues that make them significant [2, pp. 44–49]. As the excerpts in Fig. 8 indicate, the
Factor Hierarchy is a collection of graphs, one for each legal issue, two of which are shown.
The root node of each graph represents one of the main legal issues in a claim of trade
secret misappropriation [2, p. 239, Appendix 1]. The leaf nodes correspond to factors.
The intermediate nodes (which, along with the root nodes are called “abstract factors”)
13 See Vincent Aleven, CATO Workbook 1 and Reference Pages, Section 7 (1996) <http://adson.lrdc.pitt.edu/
wb1.html# theorytesting>.
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represent increasingly abstract characterizations of the legal significance of the factors
relevant to the parent issue [2, pp. 44–49]. Each abstract factor represents two possible,
conflicting assertions about its legal effect in a problem, one favoring the plaintiff and the
other the defendant.
The Factor Hierarchy allows formulation of assertions and arguments at many different
levels, in a manner similar to that of version spaces. As with a version space, the “truth”—
that is, a correct theory of the law—most likely lies somewhere between the totally abstract
and general characterizations and the most particular ones.14
Using the Factor Hierarchy, CATO’s algorithms enable it to explore alternative
rationales for the significance of the factors in the cfs, given the decisions of the retrieved
cases. In downplaying or emphasizing the significance of a distinction, the algorithms
guide the program as to which paths to follow in the Factor Hierarchy, how high to climb,
and how to group other applicable case factors in an argument supporting the interpretation
of the case [2, pp.70–72]. Significantly, since the Factor Hierarchy is a graph, a particular
factor (see, e.g., F14, Restricted-Materials-Used, in Fig. 8) may relate to more than one
abstract factor, including more than one issue.
For example, in the arguments in Fig. 7, CATO reinterprets the significance of factor
F14, the fact that in one case but not the other, the defendant used materials that were
subject to confidentiality restrictions. CATO follows alternate paths upward from F14
in Fig. 8 to different abstract factors with which to characterize the cases as similar
14 Like a version space, the Factor Hierarchy is but one interpretation of a legal domain; other interpretations
are possible. In reality, legal argument drives a process of discovering new nodes and connections in a version
space, a process which is still very difficult to model.
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or different. In step 13, Fig. 7, arguing in behalf of plaintiff, CATO downplays the
presence of F14 in Boeing. CATO characterizes Mason and Boeing abstractly as both
involving defendants on notice that using or disclosing the information would be a breach
of confidentiality (i.e., in terms of abstract factor [F115] in Fig. 8). In emphasizing the
distinction in behalf of defendant (step 17 in Fig. 7), on the other hand, CATO argues that
Mason is a very different kind of case from Boeing, in which, CATO now says, the presence
of F14 shows that defendant used improper means [F120]. In Mason, by contrast, CATO
maintains that no improper means were necessary; the defendant could have obtained its
information by legitimate means.
Empirical results support that CATO can teach students basic concepts of case-based
legal argumentation comparably to an experienced legal writing instructor [2, pp. 150–
173]. More recent experiments by Ashley and Desai with CATO-Dial, a more recent
version of CATO, support the conclusion that teaching case-based argumentation by
simulating arguments, as opposed to more simply explaining arguments with examples,
improves students’ ability to transfer the learned process to a new and unfamiliar legal
domain [8].
In teaching students how to distinguish cases, CATO-Dial simulates courtroom-style
dialectical arguments like that in Fig. 6. The earlier version taught the same material
using “mini-dialogues”, interactive explanations of examples of arguments [2, p. 141f].
In the mini-dialogue version of the courtroom-style argument in Fig. 6, CATO sets up the
lesson context and then invites the student to select the factors that he would emphasize in
distinguishing the Boeing case on behalf of the defendant. If the student makes a mistake,
the program explains the consequences by illustrating how the opponent would respond.
CATO-Dial’s courtroom-style arguments employ the same argument moves as the mini-
dialogues, but in a more realistic dialectical format.
An experiment compared the two versions of CATO in terms of the depth of knowledge
students learn. The hypothesis was that students would learn argumentation knowledge
better and more deeply if the ITS encourages them to participate more directly in making
and responding to arguments. The participants, undergraduates accepted to law school,
were randomly assigned to two groups for the different modes of instruction, CATO-
Dial’s more dialectical courtroom-style argument or CATO’s interactive explanations of
arguments. Each group took the same pre- and post-tests. The post-test was designed to
assess students’ ability on argumentation tasks and transfer tasks. The argument tasks
included selecting similarities and distinctions, making arguments that distinctions matter,
and explaining the concept of a relevant difference. The transfer tasks included critiquing
an argument in a way not previously encountered, remembering salient features of
instruction, and applying distinguishing in a legal domain unfamiliar to students beginning
law school. A legal writing professor graded the pre- and post-tests in a blind test.
A comparison of the pre-test scores showed no significant differences between groups. On
comparing the post-test scores, it was found that neither version did better than the other in
teaching the argumentation tasks. With respect to the transfer tasks, however, the CATO-
Dial group performed significantly better than the CATO group (Effect size = 1.30σ ;
Significance (2-tailed) p = 0.002) [8].
In other words, students taught with CATO-Dial’s dialectical arguments were better
able to transfer the targeted concepts and skills to other tasks and to another legal domain
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than students taught with CATO’s more didactic explanations. The courtroom simulation
appears to be more highly motivating and more realistic. In the non-dialectical mode, the
explanations of arguments and mistakes may not be particularly natural or may be too
complex. Participants who make mistakes while engaged in courtroom-style arguments
experience the consequences of their mistakes more intimately than when their mistakes
are merely explained.
From a pedagogical viewpoint, the results are highly significant. Law professors care
deeply that students learn a process of legal reasoning and argument that they can transfer
to the new legal domains and tasks they encounter in practice. Since legal rules change,
law professors aim to teach not so much the rules of a legal domain but a process by which
students can construct and interpret the current rules in any legal domain they may need to
address.
In leading students more directly to make and respond to arguments, the more dialectical
argument context may induce students to construct target knowledge. The self-constructed
representations may map better into different legal domains. The experience of using
the various argument pieces15 in their natural argument roles in CATO-Dial should
teach students how to fit a proposed decision into the hierarchical relationships of case
facts, factors, rule predicates, principles and purposes. It should teach them a kind of
“conceptual ascent” [61] in legal arguments, as disagreements as to the legal significance
of facts push the arguments higher and higher up the hierarchy in Fig. 2. Once one gets
the hang of deferring conceptualizations in making arguments, it should be easier for
students to transfer that process to a new legal domain. By contrast, eager conceptualizing
could lead to more domain-dependent generalizations whose specificity might hinder
transfer.
In summary, like Levi’s jurisprudential model, HYPO-style systems focus on assess-
ment of similarity when a new problem is observed. CABARET and CATO interpret or
provide rules for deciding the case. CABARET justifies its interpretations of a rule in light
of cases deciding statutory predicates. CATO provides a rationale about why the similarities
and differences matter, and can emphasize or downplay differences in terms of a claim’s
legal elements. CATO takes these ideas a step further by also teaching students how to
reason and argue in the HYPO style. It instructs students about a kind of abductive process
to generate hypotheses about a legal domain, test them against cases, and then, if needed,
modify them. HYPO-style systems, and especially CATO, relate closely to Sunstein’s and
Brewer’s process of abducing analogy-warranting rules and reasons. CATO’s model fur-
ther supports a kind of reflective adjustment in the sense of Sunstein and Brewer. It teaches
students to make arguments by analogy and disanalogy, to formulate and test analogy-
warranting rules, and to provide rationales why the relevant similarities and differences
matter.
15 While the experiment dealt only with distinguishing cases, we would expect the same result to apply with
respect to CATO’s other argument moves and BankXX’s argument pieces, which, as described below, address
other aspects of case-based arguments.
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6. Lazy learning and legal information retrievalEmpirical evidence from diverse experiments shows that for purposes of information
retrieval, HYPO-style systems’ lazy learning approach and implementation of aspects of
reflective adjustment can be very effective. These systems defer the process of generalizing
from the cases in the case base until the problem situation is observed. Then, by analyzing
the problem in terms of similar cases and constructing arguments by analogy, they apply
and generalize from the case base. In BankXX and SPIRE, these arguments and analyses
guide and refine information retrieval.16
In experiments with several HYPO-style systems, we found that using cases identified in
a HYPO-style analysis, such as mopc’s and best cases from the claim lattice, proved to be
an effective strategy for preparing for further information gathering. In BankXX, a program
that used resource-constrained heuristic search to peruse a symbolically represented
repository and harvest key types of information for legal argument, we found that using
information from the analysis steps—applicable dimensions, mopc’s, etc.—led to effective
ways to retrieve information from a large network of legal knowledge. In SPIRE, a hybrid
CBR-IR program that retrieved full-text cases and located relevant passages in them, we
also found that using such information—particularly cases in the top two layers of the claim
lattice—was a highly effective way to drive a traditional full-text IR engine to perform
information retrieval and location [22,50].
BankXX is driven by not only its understanding of the new case but also its
understanding of its developing argument (i.e., the information BankXX has harvested thus
far to support an argument) about the new case. The knowledge and control architecture
used by BankXX explicitly takes into account the needs of argumentation. BankXX can be
viewed in terms of an adaptive control loop: it gathers information, based on its “reflection”
of the state of the argument, and then “adapts” its sense of what information it would be
profitable to harvest in order to improve it. Its whole processing regime is one of reflective
adjustment.
SPIRE operates at two levels. It uses reflective adjustment to retrieve cases, and it uses
lazy learning to retrieve passages within them. For case retrieval, SPIRE is guided by a
HYPO-style understanding of the new case. Using similar cases from its own HYPO-
style (symbolic) case base, it formulates queries for cases from external, full-text casebases
[22,50]. For passage location, SPIRE employs a lazy approach. For each issue of interest
(e.g., “sincerity of the debtor”), it uses a mini-case base (called the excerpt case knowledge
base or excerpt ckb) that contains actual textual excerpts discussing the issue to form
passage queries to be run by the IR engine on individual cases [24,25]. The idea is that
the passages thus located will also contain discussion of the issue. At both levels—case
retrieval and passage retrieval within the case—SPIRE thus follows an approach of “what
you saw is what you want”.
The SMILE program explores a different approach to identifying textual passages
relevant to factors and assigning known factors to case texts, machine learning from
16 Implementing lazy learning in a different way, the SIROCCO program demonstrates empirically how case
decisions and explanations operationalize high-level ethics principles and past cases, improving the program’s
performance in retrieving ethics code provisions and past cases relevant to new problems [36].
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sentences marked as positive or negative instances of a factor. While it does not itself
embody a lazy learning approach, it aims to automate case indexing so that information
retrieval systems can do a better job of retrieving and presenting cases for reflective
adjustment [18,19].
6.1. BankXX
The idea behind BankXX is that at any point in the search for information, a legal
researcher has many possible avenues to explore: new cases, new legal theories, new
prototypical scenarios, etc. Since there are not enough resources—time, money, space—
to examine them all, some choices must be made to winnow the possibilities down to
the ‘best’ ones with respect to both the case at hand and the evolving argument about
it. A legal researcher often does this by making judgments about what information the
emerging argument is in need of (e.g., more contrary cases, more supporting legal theories)
and which yet-unexamined sources are likely to provide it. BankXX reifies these notions
by performing resource-constrained best-first heuristic search.
BankXX was built with three different heuristic evaluation functions:
• node-type (NT)—simple and coarse-grained, it evaluated an open node according to
what type it was.
• argument-piece type (AP)—medium-grained, it evaluated an open node according to
what argument piece[s] the node would provide information for, and whether there
was already enough of that type of information. When an argument piece was filled,
its weight fell to 0.
• argument-factor type (AF)—knowledge-intensive, it evaluated an open node according
to how good the argument would be, as measured by BankXX “argument factors”, if
information from the open node were added in.
These functions created three different versions of BankXX (BankXX/NT, BankXX/AP,
BankXX/AF).
BankXX was subject to extensive empirical evaluation, which for instance, com-
pared the performance of BankXX endowed with each of three different evaluation func-
tions, compared each version against external answer keys, and compared one version
(BankXX/AP) to a scaled down version of HYPO [54].
BankXX was a knowledge-rich program that operated in the area of personal Chapter 13
bankruptcy; particularly, about the “good faith” requirement of 1325(a)(3) discussed above.
It used non-traditional indices, like dimensions, legal theories, and recurring prototypical
fact patterns or stories, as well as traditional ones, like citation linkages between cases,
to bridge the “indexing gap” between domain level information—the new fact situation
and existing legal knowledge—and conceptualizations about the information needed for
mounting effective arguments both in general and in the case at hand.
BankXX searched its case-domain graph—a network of six types of nodes representing
cases and legal theories to find ammunition for a legal argument. It used a variety of
neighbor methods to “expand” individual nodes in the case-domain graph. For instance,
case-theory-theory-case-neighbors opened new case nodes by going from a case to a
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theory applied in the case to other favorably related theories and then to the cases that
applied these theories.
Although the case-domain graph is one network, items of like type were grouped into
spaces, each with its own special in-space links. In addition to a space representing cases
in the frame-based way of HYPO-style systems, BankXX included:
• Domain Factor Space, representing a case by a vector comprised of a case’s values
on each of BankXX’s 26 dimensions. (Non-applicable dimensions were represented
as NIL.)
• Legal Theory Space, representing a legal theory (i.e., the generalized test a court
applies) by the list of dimensions that are prerequisites for it to apply to a case. Theories
were linked by nine different types of pointers that described possible relationships
between theories (e.g., overlaps with, rejects, is-equivalent-to).
Thus BankXX enhanced its HYPO-style knowledge with information from higher levels
of the argumentation pyramid of Fig. 2.
BankXX also used two explicit types of knowledge about legal argument:
• argument pieces—12 key ingredients of argument, including supporting and best
supporting cases, contrary and best contrary cases, leading cases, applicable and nearly
applicable legal theories, prototype legal stories, factor (i.e., dimension) analysis.
• argument factors—9 HYPO-style dimensions used to represent ways to compare and
evaluate arguments.
Argument pieces and factors encode knowledge about what makes a good argument.
Both provide guidance about how to perform reflective adjustment. Argument factors apply
the idea of dimensions at a higher level. Examples are:
• centrality-of-theory—an argument is better to the extent that it relies on a well-known,
as opposed to an infrequently applied, theory
• strength-of-citations—an argument is better to the extent that its supporting cases
actually point to leading or best cases
• win-record-of-theory—an argument is better to the extent that it relies on theories
frequently applied in cases decided for the current point of view.
Performance comparisons of the three versions of BankXX suggest a classic trade-off
due to differences in how knowledge-rich the evaluations function are: inexpensive, larger,
fairly rote, lesser quality answers for BankXX/NT and more expensive, smaller, higher
quality, problem-sensitive answers with BankXX/AP and BankXX/AF. In other words, it
costs resources to perform reflective adjustment, but in terms of quality of the resulting
argument, it is worth the price.
In terms of traditional precision-recall measures (using a pre-defined answer key), in
general BankXX/NT had higher recall and lower precision than the other two versions.
These results were very robust. All three BankXX configurations achieved highest
precision on so-called meaty cases (those having a good supply of cases and theories in
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their opinions). This is exactly the sort of situation BankXX was designed to address: an
abundance of leads to explore.
Two kinds of experiments were run with a re-implemented, scaled-down, and slightly
modified version of HYPO called µHYPO. BankXX and µHYPO used the same
definitions of applicable dimensions, claim lattice, and mopc, but differed in their
definitions of best case (see footnote 8). The first kind of experiment compared µHYPO’s
performance against the hand-coded answers, as had been done with BankXX, using
traditional precision and recall measures; statistics achieved by µHYPO and BankXX’s
were then compared. The second kind of experiment measured the value-added by
BankXX by examining items such as those from the hand-coded answers that were
retrieved by BankXX but not retrieved by µHYPO.
In order to make these BankXX-µHYPO comparisons, it was necessary to put both
programs on commensurable footing. A central concern was how to define categories of
information (i.e., how to aggregate argument pieces17) for µHYPO and how to set their fill
limits.
In particular, since the original HYPO did not deal with legal theories, the BankXX
team needed to create a way that µHYPO could be said to discover them. This was done
by saying that any legal theory promulgated in any µHYPO mopc (that is, in the case’s
actual court opinion) was counted as a legal theory retrieved by µHYPO. By contrast
BankXX/AP still had to explicitly harvest a theory (i.e., close a legal-theory node and add
it to its theory argument piece) for it to be counted. For the aggregated pro and con case
categories,µHYPO was given credit for cases from the “top two layers” of the claim lattice
(i.e., cases that are within two edges of the root node), which of course included best, mopc,
and just plain cases. Since BankXX/AP is subject to fill limits (e.g., it is allowed to retrieve
only 8 aggregated-pro-cases), the same fill limits were used for µHYPO.
With respect to comparisons with the hand-coded answers, BankXX/AP outperformed
µHYPO in every category except for one notable and surprising exception: precision on
legal theories. Although BankXX/AP had higher recall of theories, µHYPO had higher
precision. These data suggest that relevant theories are indeed often promulgated in HYPO-
style most on-point cases. On the other hand, there are other sources of theories and
only looking at mopc’s is not an adequate retrieval strategy in itself. Nonetheless, these
experiments demonstrated the power of HYPO-style most on-point cases, and that although
they were not intended primarily to capture information about legal theories, they did
surprisingly well in that regard. These experiments also pointed out the need to detect
synonymy between theories. In BankXX if the theory retrieved did not have the correct
label but was defined in terms of the same dimensions as the one in the answer key,
BankXX received no credit for it, and in fact, it was hurt by it in the precision-recall
measures.
The second kind of experiments did establish that there was a “solid sense of value
added” by BankXX’s approach. BankXX generally found information cited in judicial
opinions that was not retrieved by µHYPO. But given that BankXX uses knowledge not
17 In order to eliminate subjectivity in creating the answer key, we aggregated the 12 argument pieces into just
four. For instance, aggregated-pro-cases is the union of the argument pieces for supporting and best supporting
cases. This washed out a good deal of the subtlety that BankXX achieved, but it did make comparison possible.
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present in HYPO this was not surprising. Of course µHYPO did find some items not found
by BankXX. The general lesson was that µHYPO and BankXX had complementary search
biases.
6.2. SPIRE
SPIRE is a hybrid CBR-IR system that uses the results of CBR to guide a traditional full-
text IR engine INQUERY [20] to retrieve new documents and highlight relevant passages
in them. SPIRE operated in both CABARET’s domain of the home office deduction
(particularly for retrieval of entire texts) and in BankXX’s domain of the good faith issue
in Chapter 13 bankruptcy [22,50]. SPIRE used ‘as is’ the legacy case-bases from both
systems.
SPIRE first analyzes a new problem with respect to its own case base in the standard
HYPO-style manner and then uses the results of this analysis (steps 1 through 4 described
above), particularly a simplified version of a HYPO-style claim lattice that included only
the names of the cases, to drive the INQUERY system to retrieve documents in its standard
way. SPIRE works as follows. SPIRE’s HYPO-style CBR module analyzes the problem
and selects an assortment of most relevant cases represented in its own case base, for
instance, those in the top two layers of the claim lattice, and passes the texts of these to
INQUERY’s relevance feedback module, which automatically generates a standard query
using terms or pairs of terms. The set of texts is called the relevance feedback case-
knowledge-base or RF-CKB. By using two representations of cases—as a symbolic HYPO-
style case and as a full-text opinion—SPIRE creates a “pivot” that bridges the gap between
symbolic and full text representations.
A large numbers of experiments were run with SPIRE to measure its performance as
a document-retrieval and passage-location system. For instance, to gauge its performance
on document retrieval, Daniels and Rissland varied the RF-CKB (e.g., only mopc’s or the
top two layers of the claim lattice) and the parameters of the INQUERY query, such as
the type (single terms or pairs of terms) and their number (5–400 single terms, 5–40 pairs)
[23,24,50,51]. SPIRE achieved excellent results:
(1) SPIRE found cases highly factually similar (e.g., about the same legal story);
(2) SPIRE located new cases unknown to the CBR module (e.g., existing when the case
base was created but not included);
(3) SPIRE found highly important cases decided since the case-base was built (e.g., the
leading Supreme Court case on home office deductions).
For example, when run on a problem case based on an actual tax case (the Weissman
case from CABARET’s case-base) using either the mopc or top-2-layer RF-CKB and 150
terms, SPIRE returned in its top ranked retrieved cases several highly important home
office deduction cases. It found two that were factually “on all fours” with the problem
case in the sense that they also involved professors taking home office deductions just as in
the problem case. It also found the most important home office deduction case (the Soliman
case) in all of its three procedural versions: as a 1990 lower Tax Court case, as a 1991 case
in the Court of Appeals, and as a 1993 Supreme Court case, which was the definitive case
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on this topic until Congress overruled it. None of these was known to SPIRE and all were
decided after SPIRE’s case base had been created. Thus, not only was SPIRE able to find
highly relevant new cases, but also it was able to cope successfully with the “staleness”
problem by accessing documents created long after the system’s case base.
Using the mopc and top-2-layer RF-CKB and a generous number of terms—say, 150 or
more—SPIRE consistently exceeded a stiff benchmark (81% average precision). With the
top-2-layer RF-CKB, significant improvements often kicked in at just 50 terms. With pairs
of terms, significant improvements were seen with even just 5 terms. Using more pairs (25
or so) and the top-2-layer RF-CKB, relative improvements of about 20% were consistently
achieved. Furthermore, using larger number of terms—like 300 or more—did not cause
performance to degrade. In general, pairs outscored terms and the top-2-layer RF-CKB
outscored mopc’s. It is fair to say that no human would use such a large number of terms;
in fact, most use only one or two [21]. Since the terms are generated automatically, and
at very little computational cost, there is no real cost, especially to the user, in using such
large numbers of terms, and there is a real benefit in increased performance.
SPIRE used a similar approach to locate passages from individual full-text sources. In
this “inner loop”, SPIRE uses collections of past examples of text (called excerpt-ckbs)
discussing important features of “good faith” cases (e.g., the sincerity of a debtor applying
for bankruptcy relief, the duration of the plan, the existence of special circumstances) to
generate a query to run on the document to locate passages within it where the issue is
discussed. This approach also performed well. Using a variety of query-formation methods
(e.g., sum, “bag of words”) to highlight various types of information used to discuss the
good faith issue (e.g., Boolean, date, numeric), Daniels showed that SPIRE achieved results
comparable to expert manual queries [22,25,26].
6.3. SMILE
Ashley and Brüninghaus are investigating whether a machine learning program, trained
on the corpus of manually classified textual cases in CATO’s database and guided in part
by CATO’s representation of case knowledge, can learn to assign factors and issues to
new cases presented as raw texts. Initial experiments showed that the texts of cases CATO
treated as more similar by virtue of their being closer to the root node of a claim lattice were
also more similar as measured by the cosine between the documents in the vector space
representation of texts [56]. This is important because it confirms that there is a connection
between text and factors, which makes it reasonable to learn factors from text.
The SMILE program (for SMart Index LEarner) employs the ID3 learning algorithm
[40] to induce decision trees for classifying sentences as positive or negative instances of a
factor.18 Sentences in case opinions (or in CATO’s briefer textual summaries called squibs),
from which it may be inferred that a factor applies, are treated as positive instances of the
factor; all other sentences are treated as negative instances [17–19]. For example, recall
18 A symbolic learning algorithm like ID3 was chosen after initial experiments showed that statistical learning
algorithms (i.e., those that use a numerical vector-based representation of training instances and that learn a linear
classifier) would not work because of the small number of training instances and the complexity of the concepts
to be learned.
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from the discussion of CATO’s courtroom-style argument in Fig. 6, that F15 captures the
idea that a plaintiff’s claim for trade secret misappropriation is strengthened to the extent
that the “Plaintiff was the only manufacturer making the product”. In each squib or legal
opinion, the experimenters marked-up such sentences or passages pertaining to a particular
factor.
In a preliminary evaluation, SMILE outperformed two commonsense baseline methods
for identifying factors based on whether the words in the factor names were present. Recall
and precision, calculated by case, reached as high as 80% for finding which factor applies to
a case, an indication that the methodology holds promise [18]. Integrating a legal thesaurus
significantly improved recall and precision for at least three of the factors.
Currently, Brüninghaus and Ashley are developing techniques for improving the
representation of the legal texts for purposes of learning. The hypothesis is that by
generalizing the training instances to reflect the argument roles of the participants and
objects, by schematizing their relationships, and by roughly demarking the scope of
negation, a program can learn to identify known factors in new texts and facilitate
automated indexing. They have adapted Ellen Riloff’s Information Extraction (IE) system
Autoslog and its Sundance parser to help perform these tasks [42]. By referring to role-
playing concepts like “plaintiff”, “defendant”, “plaintiff’s product”, and “product-type”,
the training examples are more general, and the learned decision trees should better
discriminate positive and negative instances. Instead of referring to specific names, unlikely
to appear in more than one case, the instances refer to generic role-playing concepts, likely
to appear over a much wider range of cases. For example, in one sentence evidencing
factor F15, Unique-Product, in the case of Innovative v. Bowen, “Innovative introduced
evidence that Panl Brick was a unique product in the industry”, the experimenters manually
substituted role-playing information for specific names to produce a more general version:
“Plaintiff introduced evidence that plaintiff’s product was a unique product in the industry”.
The resulting decision tree can relate the role information “plaintiff’s product” with
“unique” to better capture the pattern of concepts associated with the factor [19].
7. Conclusions
To a great extent, the analysis of new legal problems involves a learning process.
Legal argument about a problem drives a kind of conceptual ascent up the argumentation
pyramid. This case-based, lazy learning process of reflective adjustment involves:
• comparing the problem to similar cases,
• determining which facts are relevant,
• interpreting legal rules and predicates in the problem context,
• generalizing the relevant analogies, and
• evaluating the analogies in light of past decisions and the general policies and purposes
of a legal domain.
HYPO-style systems are one approach to computationally modeling important aspects
of this learning process. They employ dimensions and factors to bridge the gap between
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case facts and rule predicates, and they support a variety of techniques for generating
alternative interpretations of the relevant facts and statutory rules. Recent applications have
focused on the practical tasks of teaching law school argumentation skills and improving
legal information retrieval. Empirical results confirm that the case-based arguments
and analyses can engage students in argument dialogues, teach transferable skills and
successfully guide and refine legal information retrieval.
As we have seen, the HYPO family of programs embodies a lazy learning approach to
law. The decision “how to generalize beyond the training data”—that is the case base—
is deferred until each new problem situation is presented/observed [38, p. 240]. HYPO,
CABARET and CATO all make arguments by using past cases to resolve new problems.
BankXX and SPIRE retrieve or highlight information by applying past cases to new
problems. Without inducing rules, decision trees, or other representations from the cases
in advance, they offer alternative analyses, arguments or information based on dimensions
and factors applied in light of the past cases.
Modeling legal argument as a learning process, however, still presents many challenges.
Here are at least three:
First, given the importance of dimensions and factors as a representational bridge, the
question naturally arises, is it possible for a computer program to learn them. As noted
above, the dimensions and factors in the HYPO family were culled from legal textual
sources. These sources are all products of extensive human legal scholarship. As new cases
are decided, new dimensions and factors appear in the texts of legal opinions. Judges and
other legal authors learn dimensions as part of a complex task of reflective adjustment
as they compare and decide cases or critique the legal decisions of others. It is one of
the things legal scholars do based in part on their ability to read and comprehend textual
cases. While data mining techniques are being developed to extract ever more complex
information from textual forms and web-based texts, can features as complex as new
dimensions be learned from the raw texts of legal opinions?
Second, more study is needed to determine how legal experts evaluate analogical
arguments in light of principles and policies. It is not yet clear how to represent principles
and policies at the top of the argumentation pyramid, nor how to develop algorithms for
integrating them into realistic arguments. While some methods have been developed for
evaluating arguments, how should those methods take principles and policies into account?
Third, while a version-space-like Factor Hierarchy may guide arguments about a
problem, in reality arguments drive the reformulation of such hierarchies. New concepts
are discovered and interposed; existing concepts are modified, abandoned or collapsed.
What kinds of representations may support/constrain this kind of opportunistic re-
conceptualization? Can a program learn, for instance, the contexts in which one dimension
compensates for another?
While important in law, challenges like these are not unique to the legal domain. They
all have analogues in other domains of expertise, and even in ordinary discourse. If machine
learning is ever to tackle such problems successfully in ordinary discourse, why not begin
with the legal domain? Legal problems span the gamut of ordinary experience, but legal
argumentation offers AI researchers a framework for constraining how to model reasoning
about that experience: a wealth of online textual cases, hierarchically indexed, highly
cross-referenced, and moderately well-structured. Each case presents an issue of how to
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characterize those facts in terms of a relevant technical abstraction, provides alternative
arguments, reports a resolution of the conflict and elaborates upon the reasons for the
decision. Representing this framework, and implementing its application to a wide range
of factual scenarios, are a central challenge and promise of AI and Law.
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